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Building the Peace Dividend in Northern Ireland
by
Mislav Matic, Sean Byrne, and Eyob Fissuh
ABSTRACT
The role of the European Union (EU) Peace II Fund and the
International Fund for Ireland (IFI) in building the peace dividend
in Northern Ireland is examined through the perspectives of
community groups, funding agencies, local strategic partnerships,
civil servants, and development officers.  The findings presented in
this article explore the role of economic assistance in building peace
in Northern Ireland through a public opinion survey of 1,023 citizens
and by examining the perceptions of 98 participants from Northern
Ireland, the Border Area, and Dublin with direct experience of the
protracted ethnopolitical conflict and the role of international
funding assistance. The focus of this article is to evaluate the
dimensions of ‘awareness’ and ‘process’ in the funding application
process for both the EU Peace II Fund and IFI Fund. 
INTRODUCTION
The signing of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in 1998 raised hopes for
peace between the Catholics and Protestants of Northern Ireland (NI).  Building
on the fragile ceasefire that has existed since 1994, the international community
has sought to support the peace process with economic assistance through the
European Union (EU) Peace II Fund and the International Fund for Ireland (IFI).
The IFI and EU Peace and Reconciliation, or Peace II Fund (2000-06), is
organized by donor countries to promote socioeconomic development, and peace
and reconciliation. A total of €102 million of EU Structural Funds has been
allocated to this Operational Program. Peace II carries forward the distinctive
aspects of the EU Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation (1995-
99) (Program for Peace and Reconciliation or Peace I Community Initiative)
with a new economic focus.1
The IFI was devised “by the Irish and British Governments in 1986 with
two main aims; to promote social and economic advance and to encourage
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contact, dialogue and reconciliation between nationalists and unionists on the
island of Ireland.”2 The IFI Annual report of 2004 states: “the objectives of IFI
are to promote economic and social advance; and to encourage contact, dialogue
and reconciliation between nationalists and unionists throughout Ireland.”3
Monies from the IFI “were directed to disadvantaged areas, business enterprise,
rural development, wider horizons (cross community contact through
development programs), community relations, science and technology, tourism,
and urban development.”4 
The European Union (EU) Special Support Program for Peace and
Reconciliation, or Peace I, was established in 1995 to lend support to the peace
process by encouraging economic growth, social inclusion, and reconciliation
between communities. The EU monies under Peace I were channeled to “priority
areas of action . . . identified under the central objective of reconciliation,
employment, urban and rural regeneration, cross border development, social
inclusion, productive investment and industrial development.”5 Peace I provided
economic resources to traditionally deprived economic areas to empower the
grassroots by funding community project initiatives to address the economic
legacy of the conflict.6
The working assumption behind both of these international funding
initiatives is that economic assistance will help create an environment conducive
to peacebuilding and reconciliation through economic and social development.
Socio-economic inequality and political exclusion were an integral part of
Northern Ireland during the 1920s when populist unionist policies increased
Catholic alienation as rising unemployment rifled the subordinated nationalist
community and prevented a working class alliance across the ethnic divide.7
Northern Ireland’s economy is arguably the most subsidized and public sector
dependent in Western Europe.8 However, from 1970 onward British economic
policy sought to stabilize the political situation in Northern Ireland, rather than
try to resolve the underlying roots of the conflict.9 Poverty, unemployment, and
sectarianism left Loyalist and Republican working class males feeling alienated
and distrustful of British government policy, providing new recruits for Loyalist
and Republican paramilitary groups.10 As Stephen Ryan warns, however,
“economic development, like democratization may result in either a reduction or
an intensification of intercommunal conflict, and all too frequently it may feed
group egoitism not reduce it.”11 The Northern Ireland conflict is essentially an
ethnonational rather than a religious conflict.12
Thus, this article evaluates the role of the EU Peace II Fund and IFI in
building the peace dividend in Northern Ireland.  Specifically, it examines the
dimensions of ‘awareness’ and ‘process’ in relation to the EU Peace II Fund and
IFI, as related by the experiences of the study participants in the context of
creating a more flexible platform of economic assistance for building peace in
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Northern Ireland. First, we explore the qualitative data and then the quantitative
analysis is presented. 
METHODOLOGY
The evaluation of the role of ‘economic assistance’ naturally prompts a
quantitative approach, as the assistance is already defined in measurable,
monetary terms.  Consequently, international investments in peace can be
evaluated in relation to tangible goals and measurable outcomes.  However, there
are also subjective elements in this research context that are not readily
accommodated through the exclusive use of a quantitative approach.  In general
terms, the difference between these two approaches is that a quantitative
approach collects empirical data, while a qualitative approach relates meaning.13
The difficulty in relying exclusively on a quantitative approach is that it
cannot provide a meaningful explanation for the continued tensions between the
unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland in situations where the positive
measurable ‘outcomes’ fail to ameliorate existing tensions.  In a quantitative
approach researchers prescribe categories of measurement and then apply these
categories to the society being studied.  Conversely, qualitative approaches tend
to be more dialogic in process — the accessing of knowledge through inter-
subjectivity.  For this reason, this study incorporates both quantitative and
qualitative elements in a mixed approach to evaluating the efficacy of
international economic assistance for peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. 
The qualitative component of the study employs a method of in-depth
interviewing, sometimes referred to as semi-structured or focused research. This
qualitative method is one that seeks to elicit the perceptions of the respondents
in a probative process.  The resulting analysis aims to generate a greater
interpretive understanding of the meanings attached to the experiences of
individuals engaged in or affected by the international economic assistance
through the EU Peace II Fund and IFI Funds.  
The main selection criteria for establishing a list of study participants was
determined by first, accessibility; second, involvement with the administration of
international economic assistance through the EU Peace II and IFI funds in
Northern Ireland and the Border Area; third, the extent to which the funded
projects were deemed representative of promoting both socio-economic
development and reconstruction as well as peacebuilding and reconciliation; and
fourth, a random representative sample of the funded community projects in
Northern Ireland.
All of the 98 personal interviews were conducted by the first author over a
nine-week period with each subject being interviewed for approximately 80-120
minutes. The interviewer and each participant had face-to-face contact at all
times with a tape recorder placed to one side.  The narratives were transcribed
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verbatim and are cited in their original form to empower the participants in this
study.  The same primary questions were asked of each individual and no attempt
was made to regulate the time spent on any particular question.  All 98
participants were interviewed during June to August 2006.
The data for the quantitative analysis are from a Northern Ireland public
opinion survey conducted in October 2006. The research survey was
commissioned by the first author and carried out by Millward Brown Ulster and
comprised part of their October Northern Ireland Omnibus, with fieldwork
between 20-28 October 2006.    Interviewing was conducted face-to-face at 45
randomly selected sampling points at which respondents were quota-selected so
that the final sample of 1,023 adults was fully representative of the Northern
Ireland adult population over 16 years old.   All interviewing was conducted
according to the definitive standards of the IQCS (Interviewer Quality Control
Scheme) and quality control included supervisory inspection of all
questionnaires and a back check with 10 percent of respondents.  All aspects of
the research conformed with the Code of Conduct of the Market Research
Society
AWARENESS OF THE FUNDS 
The quantitative data indicates that a lack of general awareness of the IFI
and EU Peace II Fund is well established among the residents of Northern
Ireland, except for those with direct experience with the funding processes.
Moreover, there is a difference in the level of awareness among grassroots
organizations when comparing the IFI and the EU Peace II Fund. The levels of
awareness of both of these international funding initiatives differ in relation to
class, level of education, gender, and religious affiliation or ethnopolitical
identity.
With regard to the difference in the levels of awareness between the EU
and IFI funding initiatives, the study participants on the whole expressed a
greater awareness of the EU Peace II fund than of the IFI.  A community group
member from Belfast explained: 
For us we would be quite aware of the European peace program and
less aware of the IFI as a funding body, which is often seen as quite
elite and separate to grassroots and community organizations from
our perspective and very difficult to access so we know less about it.
The European peace program because of its inception being about
grassroots led by good people in touch with the community certainly
meant that there much more access, much more knowledge about the
program. 
Another community group member from Belfast expressed a similar perspective
in the following passage:
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I think we would be more aware of the European peace money rather
than the International Fund for Ireland, because in the past when we
applied to the latter it seemed to be more for business, for
commercial enterprises and didn’t run a good ship to ordinary
community projects like ours.
Evidenced in the above comments of these community members from Belfast as
well as by many of the other study participants is the perception that the IFI is
geared more toward sustainable economic projects, whereas the EU Peace II
Fund offers more opportunity for grassroots community organizations with
projects that focus on peacebuilding and cross community contact.  
An IFI development officer from Belfast, highly aware of both funding
agencies, suggested that the EU and IFI funding have a common purpose but that
the funding agencies operate in slightly different ways: 
Well one is they come from different sources, and different origins.
The International Fund for Ireland was initially a kind of
redevelopment and regeneration programme coming out of the
1980s, and the European Peace programme came out of the 1990s
and was more expressly aimed towards peace and reconciliation. On
the other hand, the mechanisms they used especially in Peace II
which was around prosperity and social inclusion. There are parallels
between them.  Structurally they are different, the scale of them is
different.  Both of them have over time begun to shift in the direction
of supporting a shared future in an explicit rather than an implicit
way.  So there are differences between them in structure and in the
kind of way in which they are carried out, underlying these are now
joined between them in terms of what they see as the priority.
As this development officer made clear, there are perceived differences between
the EU Peace II Fund and the IFI, yet both funding initiatives have various
parallel functions. 
With regard to the issue of how social class relates to awareness of the
funding initiatives, we consider the role that consultants play in the funding
application process.  An IFI development officer from Derry explained how the
funds intended for community group projects are diverted to consultants. He
explained that:  
We spent, we commissioned at least thirty, forty thousand pounds
worth of consultancy after putting the application in, more than that,
and then government commissions at least thirty thousand pounds
worth of consultancy, to due diligence economical appraisal, of what
we put in, and for relatively small sums of money. The amount of
money they’re getting out of peace for that project is six or seven
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hundred thousand. It sounds a lot but in terms of what we are
achieving it is . . . and for us to have to spend . . .. And with all my
staff time would be say one hundred thousand pounds worth of staff
time at least, direct cost of consultancy forty, forty-five thousand,
and then for the government to spend on economic appraisal another
forty on top of that to get nine hundred, it eats into the nine hundred. 
It is fair to assume that consultants are both of a higher socioeconomic class and
that they have a higher level of education than those individuals that the funding
initiatives define as members of communities hardest hit by the ethnopolitical
conflict.  So not only does socio-economic class and education increase general
awareness of the funding opportunities made available by EU Peace II and the
IFI, class and education also factors into whether one is able to derive direct
financial benefit through the funding application process of community groups.
Most of the women that participated in this study reported a relatively high
level of awareness with both EU Peace II and the IFI.  Still gender may play a
role in establishing awareness as women are likely less socially engaged than are
men.  Women from disadvantaged areas in particular are vulnerable to being less
socially engaged; their awareness of the funding opportunities is consequently
lower.
Despite the fact that women from disadvantaged areas best represent the
target group of people that have been most affected by the ethnopolitical conflict
in Northern Ireland, they are still least likely to benefit. A community group
member from Belfast remarked on the bleakness of some areas in which women
live:
I am aware of the funding agencies, because for every piece of work
that we do we have to get the funding first to do it.  We work with
women from socially disadvantaged areas, what I usually call here
working class areas, but there is not much work about so that makes
them socially disadvantaged areas.  For every programme we put on
we have to first raise the money, so therefore I would be aware of any
funding like that, that would be about. 
While some women are very familiar with the funding agencies, those in socially
disadvantaged areas still have a lower awareness of the funding opportunities
and typically represent those in greatest need of assistance.
The levels of awareness can also be related to religious affiliation and
ethnopolitical identity in Northern Ireland. The history of the region describes a
changing political environment in which either group has at some point been
disadvantaged with regard to social engagement.  This may have been truer of
the nationalists of Northern Ireland if the cumulative history is considered, but
some of the study participants describe how some unionist residents and groups
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have been socially disengaged for some time now.  For example, initially some
unionists had a negative perception of the IFI because of its link to the AIA,
believing that IFI money was an effort to buy off their opposition to the
agreement.14 Thus, an EU Peace II development officer explained how there can
be a difference in levels of awareness between nationalists and unionists in
County Cavan: 
Because the fear would be that there are groups there that are well
versed in making applications and they’re reinforced and they get the
money, whereas other groups in the South. Now we also have a
particular one, we are not too sure whether it is because of the
application or that they haven’t got the expertise or whatever.  But
we have noticed that the Protestant community in particular in north
Monaghan, have been slow to get involved in it, but that is
something that is being addressed as well. But it could be for reasons
other than the application, but the applications they may need help
with them. 
This development officer from County Cavan suggested that the unionist
community in some cases may be less aware than their nationalist counterparts
of the funding opportunities and that this lesser awareness may be the result of
factors besides the difficulty of the forms.
A community group member from Derry mentioned several factors that
contribute to a disparity with regard to awareness of the funding opportunities
between the unionist and nationalist communities. He explained: 
Derry is awash with self help initiatives, whereas if you actually go
into the Protestant community it’s more, they don’t think along
community lines in that sense, it’s very much about the individual
and they were also very, very dependent on the State. An example, a
classic example that would be in the engineering industry the vast
majority of people that left school and went into that, would have
went to work in the shipyard and all about big companies. Then
because of globalization, when the war was going on here people in
Northern Ireland didn’t realize what was happening in terms of
globalization and when the whole infrastructure collapsed there was
major pockets of disadvantage in Protestant communities, and in that
context, but there was no history of community development,
collective working which is crucial.  So I think within Protestant
communities they may find great difficulty, and obviously do they
have the capacity to work in partnership, and it must be very, very
difficult. 
As explained in the above passage, religious identity may indeed play a role in
establishing awareness of international funding initiatives. Unionist communities
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that have been disengaged from others within their own religious community as
well as from their Catholic neighbors tend to have a lower level of awareness of
international funding initiatives. The multivariate analysis supports this claim.
PROCESS 
The perspectives of the study participants with regard to the funding
application process for both the EU Peace II fund and IFI provided exceptional
detail of several recurring themes of persistent difficulties encountered by some
of the applicants.  Comparing the EU Peace II funding application process to that
of the IFI, most of the study participants found the EU Peace II funding
application process to be more onerous.
A community group member from Derry described the EU Peace II
funding application process and how it challenges some of the applicants.  He
explained that:
One of the issues I would have with the EU programme has been,
and I’m sure everybody has, it has improved in some areas and has
actually got worse in others. But there is a level of bureaucracy there;
you really do need to have a fair level of intellectual ability to be able
to fill out an application form successfully and effectively.  I think
that some of the very people that has been most affected by the
conflict, one of the affects of that conflict has been that their
educational timing has been remarkably produced or markedly
reduced and how you can square the fact that the very people the
funding should be trying hardest to help maybe with the people who
are the least able to complete the funding applications.  
Another community group member from Derry described the EU Peace II
funding application process in similar terms. 
I think the application forms were maybe eighty-four pages long,
some of them.  It was an astronomical task for us, and we would have
been quite educated. We had community work backgrounds, so for
groups, which were emerging maybe and only beginning, I can
understand why so many groups missed accessing funds particularly
at the beginning.
Both of these community group members from Derry made the point of
emphasizing the degree of difficulty in filling out the application forms for the
EU Peace II fund. 
Another closely related critique of the EU Peace II fund was also made by
another community group member from Derry. She described her frustration
with the amount of work required to complete the application forms irrespective
of the size of the project being proposed.  In her words:
Matic-Byrne-Fissuh  1/1/70  7:20 AM  Page 101
Summer 2007
102
And also I think that probably the frustrating thing is that I think that
the amount of detail and the amount of time that you have to give it
has to be commensurate with the amount of money you are applying
for it.  So even if you are not looking for a large amount of money
you still have to go through so many hoops. 
The point of how applicants are required to go through an extensive application
process even when their project is a small one was made more forcefully by yet
another community group member from Derry.
I haven’t any difficulty with the forms, the criteria on any of the
forms that I have filled in so far, is fair. My problem with filling in
the application forms is the assessment, because I have sat on panels
assessing some of these applications.  They come from organizations
that I know, and there is a lot of lies, and print, and unfortunately it
is the people who are not high in capacity in that regard loses out,
whereas their projects could be the better projects for the community.  
Applicants with limited resources that seek smaller amounts of support are
tasked with competing with applications put forward by more experienced and
larger organizations with more resources.
In contrast to the difficulties with the EU Peace II funding application
process referenced by the study participants, many found the IFI process fairly
straight forward.  One such community group member from Carrickmacross,
County Monaghan, compared the IFI favorably to the EU Peace II in the
following passage: 
IFI and the EU peace programme, well IFI is much easier to deal
with. It was more straightforward in terms of reporting back, and it
was quite simple, you got x amount showing invoices and cheques
and report back. There were no written reports . . . I think we just had
to do one kind of final written report, a report and some photographs,
whereas the peace and reconciliation funding couldn’t be compared
to in terms of bureaucracy, it was above and beyond what would be
needed. It’s contradictory and hypocritical, I mean it is meant to be
able to target groups of the peace programme most of whom might
come out of disadvantage and yet even the application form you need
specialized skills to complete the application form and aims and
objectives and let alone report back financial procedures.  So in
terms of comparison IFI was much easier to deal with. 
Consider this passage in the context of our discussion of awareness — where we
found that there was a greater level of awareness of the EU Peace II fund over
that of the IFI and that IFI was perceived more often as being more exclusionary.
The narratives of the study participants suggest that while the EU Peace II fund
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may have a wider flexibility in accepting applications than the IFI, the EU Peace
II funding application process is far more challenging and less straightforward
than that of the IFI.
A community group member from Belfast offered an explanation of how
successful applications got through in the EU Peace II fund and how challenging
the process can be: 
One of the reasons why we were very successful was not just
because we had a very successful and private tested programme on
the ground in peace and reconciliation work. But because we had the
intellectual and administrative ability to fill in very, very difficult
application forms. Some of the smaller organizations many of which
I respected had neither the know how or the money to pay for
professionals to fill in these application forms for them. So there was
a considerable distance between the levels of maturity as many
grassroots organizations had significant value on the ground.  
Small grassroots organizations are challenged to compete with larger
organizations with greater professional resources for funding that is intended to
target disadvantaged areas in Northern Ireland and the Border area. 
Another community group member from Belfast described how the EU
Peace II funding application proved difficult, requiring a significant amount of
personal information.
When we originally applied for the money it was a very difficult
application process. The form itself consisted of maybe thirty pages,
all quite intense; a lot of information had to be given, every single
thing that you intended to do over the next couple of years had to be
recorded.  So these were objectives that you had to meet then over
the next couple of years, that was ok. But they would constantly do
these checks on how our organization was running, and they would
want to know a lot of personal information about people who would
come to us and they disregarded the fact that these people were still
feeling under threat so that had to be constantly made clear that these
people were afraid, that they really don’t want people to have all this
personal information. 
The requirements of the funding application process for the EU Peace II fund
often presents smaller grassroots organizations with bureaucratic challenges that
are insensitive to the needs of the community.
Of the study participants that encountered a higher degree of difficulty in
completing the EU Peace II funding application, most cited the length of the
application, amount of required documentation in reporting, and the degree of
expertise expected in general by the EU.  An EU Peace II development officer
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from Monaghan, County Monaghan, described his frustration with the EU Peace
II funding application process.
We have always said, even in drawing up the operational programs
where we would be in on the consultation stage at the beginning.
One of the main gripes we would have had was the amount of
documentation a person has to go through before they get their
application in. By continually keeping on about the gripe we have
been able to get them to make it more customer friendly. The only
problem in relation to European funding is that Europe requires a
certain degree of accountability, you would have accountability
anyway, but maybe a greater degree of accountability than is actually
necessary, we think.
This development officer from the Border Area urged that individuals and
community groups from the disadvantaged areas have a greater say with regard
to the definition of the stated goals of the international funding initiatives and
more say with regard to the criteria and process of the funding applications.  
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
In this section we employ a multivariate analysis to examine the factors
that have shaped popular awareness of the IFI and EU Peace II fund in Northern
Ireland. We resort to multivariate analysis because simple bivariate relationships
may not hold once all other factors have been taken into account. We employ a
binary response regression technique to learn about popular awareness of the IFI
and EU Peace II fund in Northern Ireland. We employ binary probit models to
model the awareness of the IFI and EU Peace II fund separately. It is not the task
of this article to develop these models in great detail. Rather we only present a
brief discussion of the interpretation of the coefficient.
As in Wooldrige15 we employ the binary dependent variable regression
model of the form:
E[y/x = 0[1 – F(x)] + 1F(x)] = F(x) 1.0
where x is kxn data matrix and  is kx1 vector of coefficients. It is noteworthy
that in this class of probability regression models the parameters of the model
may not reflect the true marginal effects. That is to say the coefficients are not
the same as the marginal effects. Rather the generic marginal effect form is given
by:
1.1
E[y/x] dF(x)
 = f(x)
d(x)x) { }
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Where f(.) is the normal density function that corresponds to the cumulative
normal probability distribution function, F(.). It is clear from equation (1.1) that
to get the marginal effect we need to weight the slope by probability density.
Hence, for a probit model, the marginal effect would be given by:
1.2
where (t) is the standard normal density. Table 1 reports the estimated marginal
effects. Equation (1.1) also illustrates that the value of the marginal effect depends
on the level of all variables (xi). This leaves us with a decision about the values of
the variables to be used to compute these effects. In our case the marginal effects
are calculated at mean values of all other variables. In cases where the
explanatory variable is a dummy variable we calculate the difference in predicted
probabilities at the values of 1 and 0. Keeping this in mind the results could be
interpreted as follows. Let us take the marginal effect of the variable gender on
the awareness of the IFI or/and EU Peace II fund in Model 1 of Table 1.  For a
male individual respondent the predicted probability of being aware of any
company funded by the IFI or the EU Peace II fund is higher by 0.06 (6 percent)
than their female counterparts, keeping all other variables constant at their mean
value. All the other coefficients can be interpreted likewise.  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is a binary response variable that takes a value of
1 if respondents are aware of any company funded by either the IFI or/and the
EU Peace II fund otherwise it is 0.
Results 
The marginal effects in Table 1 show that there is a variation in the
awareness of the funds across, gender, religion, age group, economic class, and
employment experience. We present the discussion of the results on next page.
E[y/x] dF(x)
 = (x)
d(x)x) { }
Matic-Byrne-Fissuh  1/1/70  7:20 AM  Page 105
Summer 2007
106
Table1.
Probit model on perceived awareness of EU Peace fund and/or the IFI 
Variable Marginal Effects Z-statistic
Catholic 0.090** (2.31)
Male 0.055** (2.1)
Abc1 male -0.106** (-2.26)
Not working -0.018 (-0.61)
Abc1 class 0.142* (4.28)
Abc1 Catholic 0.029 (0.48)
C2 Catholic -0.005 (-0.11)
Age 15-25 0.109* (-2.59)
Age 25-34 0.046 (1.03)
Age 35-50 0.078*** (1.78)
Age 50-64 0.032 (0.76)
Observed proportion 0.18
Predicted Proportion 0.16
Correctly specified (%) 81.75
Chi2(11) 67.26
N 1019
Data source: Northern Ireland Public Opinion Survey (2006).
Robust z statistics in parentheses . . .*Significant at 5% ** significant at 1% . . . *** significant at 10%   
Note: Abc1 Male= (Male)x(Catholic); Abc1 Catholic=( Abc1)x(Catholic); C2 Catholic= (C2)x
(Catholic)
Employment history
We can see that the coefficient of the variable which indicates that a person
has never been employed (Not Work) shows that there is negative relationship
between employment and awareness. A respondent who has never been
employed is less probably aware of the IFI and/or EU Peace II fund than
someone who is employed at least for some time, keeping other things constant.
This may imply that employment is a good source of information for someone to
be aware of the activities by the IFI and EU Peace II funding agencies.
Gender
A gender variable is included in our model to indicate whether a person is
female or male.  A gender dummy assumes a value of 1 if a respondent is male,
otherwise the value is 0.  It is our expectation that gender may have a significant
effect on the awareness of the IFI and the EU Peace II fund in Northern Ireland.
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In line with our expectation Table 1 shows that the probability of being aware of
both the IFI and/or EU Peace II fund is higher for male than female respondents,
keeping other things constant. 
Religion
It is well known that religion is a badge of the identity of both communities
in the Northern Ireland conflict.16 To capture the role of this variable in the
Northern Ireland conflict the respondents were classified into three religious
groups: Catholic, Protestant, and others. In the multivariate analysis we focus on
Protestants and Catholics rather than unionists and nationalists.17 Accordingly,
there are two dummy variables for each religious group. The “other” religious
group is dropped from the sample. It is expected that Catholics compared to
Protestants will be more aware of the IFI and EU Peace II fund. As expected,
Table 1 shows that Catholics have a higher probability of being aware of the IFI
and/or EU Peace II fund than respondents with other religious affiliations. This
tends to support the findings from the qualitative data. Byrne et al. (2006) report
similar results using a 1997 survey of the public’s perceptions of the IFI and EU
Peace I fund.18 Table 1 also shows that professional Catholics (variable Abc1
Catholic) seem to have a greater awareness of both funds than the other
Catholics. On the other hand, the coefficient of the “C2 Catholic” variable
indicates that semi-skilled Catholics are less aware of any non-governmental
organization (NGO) or business funded by either or both of the international
funds.
Economic Class
This article also investigates the correlation of a category of economic
class a respondent belongs to and his/her awareness of the funds. Three dummy
variables were generated to represent the three economic classes, which are
ABC1 (professional class), DE (skilled class), and C2 (semi-skilled class)
dummy. Table 1 presents that the coefficient of ABC class is positive and
statistically significant which suggests that the respondents from the professional
class are more likely to be aware of  either the IFI or/and the EU Peace II fund
relative to those respondents in the semi-skilled class. This result is not counter
intuitive. Professionals are relatively more educated than the skilled and
semiskilled classes and would be expected to enjoy good access to information
to make use of the funding opportunities. This could be because of their ability
to understand and tap into existing information or purely because of network
effects.
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Age
The variable age is also included as a determinant factor on the models
considered in this study. We include dummy variables for five age groups in
Table 1. To avoid the dummy variable trap we drop the age group 65 and above
from the regression model and this age group serves as a reference group for the
interpretation. This way we are able to control the effect of age on the models
considered in this article. Table 1 above shows that the probability of being aware
of the IFI and the EU Peace II fund increases with age. More specifically, the
results show that respondents in age group 15-25 have the lowest level of
awareness about NGOs financed by the international funds (IFI and the EU
Peace fund).
DISCUSSION
The application process for both the EU Peace II fund and the IFI is
prescriptive and is ultimately devised by the funding agencies themselves; these
agencies establish the objectives and identify the criteria of a predefined path to
peace.  The community groups applying for these funds often wrestle with their
projects to position them to qualify in accordance with the set criteria.  Rather
than have the international economic assistance for peace in Northern Ireland
tailor its format to fit the existing needs of the communities, the funding is
processed in a way that has those in need ‘fit’ the funding criteria.
The funding application process for the EU Peace II and the IFI ought to
be more dialogic, with more of an interchange of ideas that inspire effort in a
continual process of building peace.  Such a process can be likened to a dialogue
that continues despite uncertainty and ambiguity, a dialogue that is ongoing and
does not commit to a linear schedule.  Conceptualizing such a dialogue as an
ongoing process liberates the truth, providing flexibility to our understanding
through the acceptance of change. 
Those applying to the EU Peace II fund and the IFI ought to have more
input in devising the objectives of the funds as well as the criteria and process.
Peace cannot be prescribed to Northern Ireland; peace, if it is to be realized, must
grow through positive relations between individuals and communities.  These
relations cannot be prescribed by those outside the community; positive relations
are achieved through the engagement of those opposed in a mutually respectful
process of participation in the socio-economic development of community.  In
this view, the funding agencies are to work with the community groups on best
practices to jointly develop new objectives and criteria of both funds and engage
in the application process together to build peace.19
John Paul Lederach, a leading scholar and practitioner in the field of
peace and conflict studies, makes the case for peacebuilding through an exercise
of the moral imagination, which he describes as “the capacity to imagine and
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generate constructive responses and initiatives that, while rooted in the day-to-
day challenges of violent settings, transcend and ultimately break the grips of
those destructive patterns and cycles.”20 Through the exercise of the moral
imagination new possibilities of engagement are made possible as the
imagination reaches beyond prescribed views of peace that often create social
polarity.  The moral imagination inspires new relations by refusing to be limited
to the parameters of prescription; imagination allows for new emerging patterns
of connection.
Lederach envisions new possibilities with the adoption of a moral
imagination and believes that it can create crucially important social space which
he refers to as “platforms.”  In his words:
Platforms: Ongoing social and relational spaces, in other words,
people in relationship who generate creative processes, initiatives,
and solutions to the deeper-ingrained destructive patterns and the
day-to-day ebb and flow of social conflict. As such, a platform has a
continuous generative capacity that is responsive to longer-term
relational patterns and is adaptive to changing environments.  The
focus of a platform is to create and sustain a foundation capable of
generating responsive change processes that address both the
immediate expression of the conflict and the deeper epicenter of the
conflictive relational context.21
Both the EU Peace II fund and the IFI can serve as platforms in this sense by
adopting a more participatory model of economic assistance for peacebuilding in
Northern Ireland.
The EU Peace II fund and the IFI can be made more participatory through
the engagement of grassroots community members and groups in both
establishing the goals of the funding initiatives and criteria as well as a
cooperative process in the funding application process.  In this way, those that
are targeted by international assistance are provided with the opportunity to
determine the terms of engagement with these funding initiatives. Rather than
prescribing peace to Northern Ireland, a more participatory approach would seek
to both define and build a peace together through the inclusion of all voices in
the process.
A participatory funding model would accommodate changes in the
socioeconomic reality of Northern Ireland, as experienced by those from
disadvantaged areas, through an ongoing dialogic process that is flexible enough
to “imagine new paths to peace.”22 Without such participation the funding
initiatives can at times fail to deal with the challenges facing those in greatest
need of assistance.  Applicants feel alienated by funding criteria and a process
that was created independent of their direct input; applicants are expected to
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adjust to rules that they often do not understand and had no role in creating.  In
place of striving to establish accountability through more rigorous reporting
criteria, the EU Peace II and the IFI ought to be giving the grassroots
communities a greater responsibility for devising the social and economic terms
under which they plan to build peace in Northern Ireland. 
The question pursued in this article is not whether the EU Peace II fund and
the IFI have promoted peace in Northern Ireland; rather, our interest has been to
uncover the perceived shortcomings of the funding initiatives with a focus on the
dimensions of awareness and process. Through consideration of these
dimensions in the funding applications for the EU Peace II fund and the IFI the
related qualitative and quantitative data suggests several areas of improvement.
The IFI, for example, has been criticized for aspects of its administration and
some of the projects for which it has provided cash.23
Through the narratives of the study, participants the dimensions of
awareness and process were considered in the context of the role and
effectiveness of the IFI and EU funding for peace in Northern Ireland.  Our study
findings suggest that, while there were some differences reported by those
familiar with both funds, concerns with the degree of difficulty of the application
processes as well as with the equity of distribution of the funds was expressed in
relation to both IFI and EU Peace II funding. Yet, it should be noted that the EU
Peace II funding application process is perceived to be more onerous than that of
the IFI.  However, the EU Peace II fund is commonly perceived to be more
welcoming of community group projects geared to cross community contact,
whereas the IFI is seen as a resource for projects that are more economically
sustainable. 
Some of the study participants made reference to bitter disappointment
over rejected applications and the level of bureaucracy involved in the
application process. Other participants made mention of the significant
expenditure of community groups that employed consultants to assist in finding
their way through the bureaucratic maze of the funding process.  Such
expenditure counters the intent of both the IFI and EU Peace II funding in that it
does not direct the funding to those persons or groups that need it most.  With
regard to the equity of the funding distribution many concerns remain, namely,
the frustrations some persons face with not knowing why their funding
application was rejected while others were accepted. Grassroots participation in
devising the funding application process along with a greater level of
transparency of the workings of both funding agencies can serve to
accommodate many of the criticisms brought forth.
In addition, the quantitative findings indicate that more male than female,
Catholics than Protestants, professional compared with skilled and semi-skilled
classes, and those in the age range 26-65 than the 15-25 range are aware of both
funding agencies. Young professional Catholic males in their early thirties in
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particular seem to be most aware of the funds. This very well educated group is
taking advantage of new economic and political opportunities as Northern
Ireland transitions from a protracted ethnopolitical conflict to a new era of peace
and prosperity.
Through the adoption of a participatory approach to peacebuilding in
Northern Ireland the EU Peace II fund and the IFI would seek to include some
of the perspectives voiced in this article into the very design of the funding
initiatives.  Ideally, and in accordance with Lederach’s moral imagination, this
can be achieved by including those from the socially disadvantaged areas of
Northern Ireland in the dialogue that surrounds the creation of such funding
initiatives.  In so doing, the EU Peace II fund and IFI can serve as flexible
platforms from which the people of Northern Ireland can realize peacebuilding
through the new relations.   
CONCLUSIONS
This article contributes to the important debate over the impact of
economic aid on the peace process in Northern Ireland. It is particularly timely,
considering the speculation over a financial “peace dividend” to support the
province’s new power-sharing government. The article indicates that external
funding initiatives tend to disproportionately benefit the privileged, that
nationalists are better organized as communities than unionists, the EU is overly
bureaucratic, and less needy communities benefit more from such initiatives than
the needy.
The amounts involved in these two funds are relatively small sums. The
EU funds are larger than the IFI providing yet another pertinent reason for why
the participants are more aware of the EU funds.24 The large British subvention
to Northern Ireland prevented a political settlement as living standards were
maintained at a reasonably high level despite the high level of political
violence.25 Yet, every responsible discussion of the EU Peace II fund and the IFI
in Northern Ireland must concede that the assistance has brought about a level of
positive change to the region. The assistance from the IFI and EU Peace II fund
has created jobs and promoted peace and reconciliation through the various
employment opportunities and cross community contact programs sponsored by
the funds.26 A community group member from Carrickmacross, County
Monaghan, described how international funding assistance has had a positive
impact on Northern Ireland:
It really has propelled I think the whole process once people see
money and it raises such an awareness which is great. It got people
in this area talking for the first time, it freed them that firstly to bring
to our awareness that we had been impacted and on such different
levels that we had been impacted and secondly it allowed to people
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a forum to discuss this and especially in community work that you
know old issues and all sorts could be voiced in a safe environment.
Peacebuilding, however, is an ongoing organic process that relies on the
establishment of new relations — bringing people and communities together in
an effort to create a better future for all.27
International assistance, both economic and resource based, is required to
help build the peace in Northern Ireland. A participatory approach to
peacebuilding does not silence the professional view; rather it includes it in an
ongoing dialogue and multi-track systems approach that attempts to articulate a
future peace in an ever-changing present, in new and creative ways.28 Political
leaders, academics, and other professionals need to work with those from the
disadvantaged areas in a cooperative manner to realize the goals of peace.  Most
importantly, both funding initiatives must avoid fostering a competitive
environment in which a greater and more diverse polarity is created in an existing
social climate of tension.  Further, the EU Peace II fund and the IFI must create
procedural mechanisms for lessening the competitiveness of the funding process
and the rise of feelings of disenfranchisement that stem from failed funding
applications. A more inclusive and participatory approach to devising the funding
initiatives and in the management of the funds could be an important step in
realizing these goals. 
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